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Executive	  Summary	  
Many of the envisaged applications of synthetic biology, especially in the environmental and 
agricultural sectors, would involve the use of engineered micro-organisms outside of laboratories and 
industrial installations. The aim of this workshop was to explore the prospects for these synthetic 
biology applications, including issues related to regulatory appraisal, environmental risk assessment, 
and risk reduction measures proposed by synthetic biologists. The key themes that emerged from the 
workshop discussions are summarised below. 
The need to understand the whole system 
In the 1980s and early 1990s there was much talk and hope about using genetically modified micro-
organisms (GMMOs) for agricultural and environmental applications, yet that first wave of 
enthusiasm and research did not lead to commercially viable products. Microbiologists who had been 
involved in field experiments with genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMOs) in the 1990s 
noted that a key reason why that avenue of research had been discontinued was that soil ecosystems 
were diverse, complex and poorly understood. This meant that engineering micro-organisms that 
could reliably perform their intended function once released into the environment was very difficult. 
Participants agreed that synthetic biology would need to draw on expertise in ecology and soil 
microbiology not only to understand potential impacts and to inform the assessment of risk, but also in 
order to help improve the viability of products proposed for deliberate release into the environment. 
Survive or die? 
The discussions illustrated that there is a balance to be reached between making GMMOs survive long 
enough in the environment to perform their intended function, and aiming to contain the organisms 
and the inserted or modified genetic material in order to reduce the potential for environmental harm. 
There was a general agreement that most of the attention in risk research, risk assessment and policy 
discussions surrounding environmental risks has focused on how to make sure that the genetically 
engineered organisms released into the environment (or other organisms that pick up their genetic 
material) do not survive and ‘take over’ natural ecosystems, i.e. ‘the superbug question’. Some 
participants suggested that this might be the wrong question and that the real challenge is how to 
create micro-organisms that could compete well enough with pre-existing bacterial populations in 
order to perform reliably and effectively in the environment. This was essential for the GMMOs to 
deliver their intended benefits and/or to be of commercial interest. 
Blurred boundaries 
Participants discussed the blurred boundaries between ‘contained use’ and ‘deliberate release’ of 
GMMOs. Some participants noted the importance of the context of use in determining whether a 
product is considered ‘contained’ or ‘released into the environment’. For example, a trained scientist 
using a live bacterial biosensor contained in a vial and used in a ‘lab in a van’ in Germany is very 
different from a non scientist using the same product in a village in Bangladesh. Participants also 
discussed the difference between product-based and process-based regulations and their implications 
for how genetically modified organisms are treated differently by US and EU/UK regulatory systems. 
Regulators and others noted that there are blurred boundaries around these categories, which have to 
be constantly re-examined. For some participants, this appeared somewhat illogical or inconsistent, 
especially when different regulatory authorities (e.g. US/EU) make different judgements about the 
same ‘things’. 
Engineered biocontainment 
There was general agreement that engineered biocontainment based on built-in genetic designs could 
never be fail-safe: they may be able to decrease, but could not completely eliminate, the frequency of 
Horizontal Gene Transfer (HGT) and the likelihood of persistence and dispersal of released micro-
organisms. Bacterial populations have well-known mechanisms, including HGT, that can enable them 
to evolve and circumvent biosafety designs. Therefore, given high enough population numbers and/or 
long enough timescales, bacteria may override any kind of ‘kill switch’. Participants had different 
opinions about the implications this has for the role of engineered biocontainment for biosafety. For 
some participants, the focus should be on trying to improve genetic biocontainment designs and to 
better quantify the incidence of HGT using mathematical models and/or field experiments. Others 
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suggested the focus should shift towards research to evaluate the potential consequences on human 
health and the environment if and when HGT occurred and/or the GMMO did persist or disperse 
following the deliberate release of a specific GMMO into the environment. Some synthetic biologists 
thought that engineered biocontainment could, in circumstances where the potential negative 
environmental impact of HGT or dispersal was assessed as low, be considered an appropriate 
approach to help maximise biosafety. Other participants (including NGOs, microbiologists and 
regulators) stressed that engineered biocontainment is not by itself an adequate biosafety approach. 
Regulators present emphasised that the key question for risk assessment was to assess whether or not 
the GMMO released could be associated with potential harm, and that HGT in itself does not 
constitute a hazard. 
Risk, benefit and uncertainty 
Different approaches to risk were apparent in the discussions. Some participants stressed that risk is a 
narrow concept, and is radically different from uncertainty. They argued that a risk-based approach 
leads to focusing attention on measuring and modelling probabilities of known adverse events, 
ensuring that identified risks are ‘low’, and developing ways to contain hazardous materials. While 
this is the current dominant approach and seemed suitable to many participants, others contested its 
appropriateness and argued that past lessons called for more precautionary and participative 
approaches that would build on a wider range of expertise to help open up areas of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance. This would focus on unanticipated as well as known adverse effects. The 
importance of assessing benefits as well as risks was also stressed by many participants. Some 
participants felt that this could help accelerate regulatory decisions for applications that were thought 
to have obvious humanitarian benefits, while others suggested that, if conducted methodically, benefit 
assessment could help challenge unwarranted claims about benefits and open up deliberations about 
their nature (e.g. Who benefits, and under what conditions? How does this solution compare with 
other options to address the same problem?). 
Effects of over-promising 
Several participants suggested that the current focus on demonstrating impact in grant applications can 
lead to exaggerated claims about the speed and scope of future economic and social impact of research 
projects. A number of participants suggested that such over-promising could have undesirable effects. 
Some cautioned that this could lead to disenchantment if promises are not met, which could be 
damaging to the field. Some suggested that because synthetic biology is seen as a new and promising 
field, it is attracting substantial funding and young researchers, which could lead to other fields such 
as microbiology or ecology being under-resourced. 
The need to understand ‘the problem’ 
Several participants stressed the importance of comprehensively understanding the nature of the 
problem that synthetic biology applications are proposing solutions to. A number of participants 
argued that synthetic biology is a ‘technology looking for a problem’, i.e., it is starting with the tools 
and looking for ways to apply them, rather than looking at a problem and finding ways to solve it. This 
was considered by these participants to be detrimental because it did not encourage deliberation about 
choices between different approaches to tackle a problem, and also because it tended to be associated 
with simplistic understandings of complex problems that neglected the entanglement of biological, 
social, economic and political dimensions involved. Synthetic biologists argued that this was an unfair 
criticism of the field and that it was not unique to synthetic biology. 
Responsibility for ‘broader questions’ 
Synthetic biologists present generally agreed that there were real and important ‘broader questions’ 
about the purpose of their work, but they disagreed about the extent to which they could or should be 
held responsible for addressing all these questions. Some argued that dealing with them was outside 
their remit or sphere of expertise; whereas others stated that scientists involved in the research should 
be involved in addressing these questions. Social scientists and NGOs present did not expect 
laboratory scientists to be held responsible for all the impacts of their work, and focused instead on the 
responsibility of synthetic biologists who are promoting the field to temper their claims and to 
acknowledge uncertainty. Some also argued that responsibility for identifying what counts as a 
problem and determining the best approach to deal with it needs to be shared more broadly.  
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Summary	  of	  Discussions	  
Many of the envisaged applications of synthetic biology, especially in the environmental and 
agricultural sectors, would involve the use of engineered micro-organisms outside of laboratories and 
industrial installations. The aim of this workshop was to explore the prospects for these synthetic 
biology applications, including issues related to regulatory appraisal, environmental risk assessment, 
and risk reduction measures proposed by synthetic biologists. The workshop brought together a range 
of participants from different sectors of society with different kinds of expertise, different perspectives 
on synthetic biology and also, significantly, different perspectives on the relationship between 
‘science’ and ‘society’. The workshop brought together synthetic biologists, microbial ecologists, 
regulators, public research funders, experts from environmental and food safety NGOs, and social 
scientists with expertise in governance and environmental risk assessment. (These categories were not 
mutually exclusive: for example, some synthetic biologists had been trained as microbiologists, and 
several social scientists, NGO representatives, and regulators had PhDs in microbiology or molecular 
biology). In order to facilitate open and productive discussion, a scoping report was prepared and 
circulated to all participants in advance of the workshop and the meeting was held under the Chatham 
House Rule. 
 
Note that this document is a summary of discussions that occurred at the workshop and that the 
authors do not necessarily endorse the positions reported. Arguments are reported even when 
they were only expressed by one or a few participants. The aim of this document is to represent 
the diversity of views expressed, and does not seek to assign particular weight to the arguments 
reported. This document does not represent a consensus position. 
 
 
SESSION 1: Learning from past experiences with released GMMOs 
In the 1980s and early 1990s there was much talk and hope about using genetically modified micro-
organisms (GMMOs) for agricultural and environmental applications, yet that first wave of 
enthusiasm and research did not lead to commercially viable products. This session aimed to learn 
from past experience by drawing on the expertise of two microbiologists who were involved in field 
experiments at the time. It examined some of the reasons why this first wave of GMMOs failed to 
realise its promise and explored the prospects for synthetic biology in this area today. 
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Presentation by Dr Penny Hirsch 
Agroecology, Rothamsted Research 
“GM Rhizobium inoculants as biofertilisers”1 
Soil micro-organisms perform a number of important functions, particularly in nutrient cycles that underpin soil 
fertility and plant health. Microbial applications have been used to improve agriculture and horticulture for a 
long time. For example, Bacillus thuringiensis has been used as a biopesticide and Rhizobium as a biofertiliser 
since the 19th century. Modifying root-nodulating bacteria such as rhizobia for improved nitrogen fixation was 
one of the first targets of genetic engineering investigated in the 1980s. However, while this worked in the lab, 
results in the field were not consistent due to the variability of soil ecosystems and environmental conditions 
between sites. Soil microorganisms are very numerous and diverse, only a small minority can be cultured in the 
lab, and many belong to novel groups. Soil microbiology is heterogeneous, complex and poorly understood, and 
this is the environment in which GMMOs would be released. 
Rhizobia, like other bacteria, are known to have many mechanisms through which they can exchange genes. 
This is important as the genes controlling symbiosis with plants are located on plasmids in many rhizobia; 
consequently it is a leaky system, not a contained system. A series of field experiments to assess GM rhizobia as 
agricultural inoculants were funded by the European Commission from 1996 to 2001, with a number of trials 
conducted by Penny Hirsch at Rothamsted Research. The aim was to monitor persistence and dispersal of GM 
rhizobia, and to investigate occurrences of gene transfer. The results challenged some prior assumptions. For 
example, it was found that introduced rhizobia persist in the field even in the absence of their plant host. It was 
also found that in the absence of any plants an introduced GM strain which lacked a “symbiotic” plasmid had a 
survival advantage. Experiments in Germany tested a DNA recombinase deficient (RecA-) strain of 
Sinorhizobium that was expected to be more susceptible to DNA damage from UV light, and hence less likely to 
persist in the environment, but the results revealed that this did not have any effect on survival of the GM strain. 
Overall, the results showed that soil and climatic factors influenced survival of the rhizobia, that gene behaviour 
was affected by environmental factors, and that improved nitrogen fixation was not reproducible across different 
environments. Plasmid transfer from GM rhizobia to the natural rhizobia populations was not detected over the 
15 year time scale of the experiment, using the techniques available at the time. This does not, however, rule out 
the occurrence of HGT as it might be detectable over a longer period or using other techniques. 
Ultimately funding dried up for these kinds of experiment. This was due to a number of factors including a shift 
in interest towards the modification of plants rather than bacteria; the increasingly costly process of obtaining 
approvals for field experiments; and increasing public resistance to GM. However, the main reason for the 
decline in interest was the inconsistent agronomic results obtained with GMMOs compared to conventional 
agrochemicals. The GM strains were unable to demonstrate reliable efficacy across different fields. If a 10% 
yield increase cannot be claimed, agronomists are not interested. The field trials did, however, generate 
interesting new knowledge about the biology of rhizobium. 
One way to overcome the inherent unreliability of GMMOs when used in the environment might be to develop 
semi-contained applications for which the conditions can be controlled to some extent, for example glasshouse 
applications or bioremediation treatments for industrial waste stream. 
The context for global agriculture has changed since the 1980s. There are now calls for us to move away from a 
petroleum-based economy towards more sustainable agriculture. Perhaps this will change the way in which GM 
approaches are considered. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For further details see Hirsch, P. R. (2004). "Release of transgenic bacterial inoculants - rhizobia as a case study." Plant and 
Soil, 266: 1-10. 
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Presentation by Prof. Ian Thompson 
Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford 
“Field release of free-living GM bacteria and prospects for synthetic biology in bioremediation” 
The first half of this presentation focused on field releases of free-living bacteria conducted at the University of 
Oxford Wytham Field Station in 1993-1994. The key research question of interest at that time was persistence of 
GM bacteria in the environment. To investigate this, the team started by studying the natural bacterial 
community in the field and then isolated a typical bacteria that they thought would survive well (Pseudomonas 
fluorescens). They then inserted genes into the genome of this bacterium to enable researchers to detect it in 
samples taken from the field (the GM bacteria could grow on petri dishes containing lactose, xylene and 
kanamycin). This GM bacterium was released into the field as a seed inoculant where it colonised the roots and 
leaves of growing crops (sugar beet and wheat), and the survival of the genetically marked bacteria was 
monitored for two years. People often say that when GMOs are released into the environment they just die, but 
this was not what was found in this experiment. Results from this field experiment demonstrated that the 
genetically marked bacteria survived through a season at low but detectable amounts, but not across seasons. 
Interestingly, they survived longer in the glasshouse than in the environment due to lower competition with other 
bacteria. The fitness of the bacteria varied with the age of the plant, the season, and the plant material sampled. 
For example, there were significant differences between bacterial populations recovered from the leaves and 
roots. Overall, the experiment demonstrated that when the released GM bacteria had to compete with pre-
existing bacterial communities in the real world, they survived reasonably well short term but could not compete 
particularly well in the longer term. 
The team also investigated survival of the same bacteria carrying a plasmid which conferred resistance to 
mercury. Carrying additional genes in the form of this natural plasmid did impact survival, with plasmid-bearing 
bacteria quickly outcompeted and decreasing to almost undetectable levels in the first 100 days after the initial 
inoculation. However, once the plant (sugar beet) began to mature, the plasmid seemed to provide a benefit that 
meant that the bacteria carrying the plasmid reappeared from very low levels to levels equivalent to those of the 
GM bacteria not containing the plasmid. Overall, the persistence of the released GM bacteria depended very 
much on the conditions. The experiments also confirmed the complexity of natural soil microbial populations: 
more than 2000 genotypes of Pseudomonas were detected, with only 26 detected more than once. A key 
conclusion, that the team emphasised when speaking to the Department of Environment who had funded the 
research, was that the results showed that no single GM bacterium was likely to persist after deliberate release 
into the environment. What determined the persistence of the overall population of Pseudomonas fluorescens 
was the dominance of particular genotypes that survived best in particular conditions, there was a continual 
turnover of the population as those conditions changed. This is also an important lesson for those interested in 
synthetic biology applications in the environment2. 
The second half of this presentation explored the prospects for synthetic biology in bioremediation. Waste clean 
up is an important challenge for industry. The company co-founded by Ian Thompson, Microbial Solutions, uses 
non-genetically engineered bacteria to detoxify industrial waste streams. The company does use GMMOs, but 
only in contained environments, as sensors. Synthetic biology may be able to improve the process of microbial-
based detoxification but industry is currently unwilling to use GM organisms. Another reason for not using GM 
or synthetic biology is that in many cases there are natural microbes available that are already effective: 
synthetic biology cannot outbid 3.5 billion years of evolution. There is no point in trying to synthesise synthetic 
bacteria when natural bacteria can already do the job. There may be a role for synthetic biology to address 
‘pinch-points’ where natural bacteria are ineffective. For example, there is a treatment plateau of concentrations 
of toxic materials under which natural organisms are not effective. Maybe synthetic biology can be used to 
improve this. But for now it may be best to focus on applications that do not require deliberate release, such as 
biosensors, the production of pharmaceuticals and bioenergy in bioreactors, or DNA data storage. When a 
GMMO is released into the environment it is unlikely to compete successfully with indigenous microbial 
populations. In contained situations, efficacy is easier to manage because there is less competition from other 
bacteria. In the longer term synthetic biology could help to develop tools for understanding microbial ecology 
and physiology, which is an area that needs further research. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For further details, see: Lilley, A. and Bailey, I (1997). “Impact of Plasmid pQBR103 Acquisition and Carriage on the 
Phytosphere Fitness of Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW25: Burden and Benefit”. Applied and Environmental Microbiology, 
63(4): 1584-1587. 
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DISCUSSION 
A number of themes emerged from the discussion: 
In order to develop viable synthetic biology applications that would require release into the 
environment to perform their intended function, there is a need to draw on ecological expertise; 
additionally, synthetic biology could also be a useful research tool to better understand ecosystems. 
Both of the talks by microbiologists who had been involved in field experiments with genetically 
modified micro-organisms (GMMOs) in the 1990s noted that that a key reason why that avenue of 
research had been discontinued was that soil ecosystems were diverse, complex and poorly understood. 
This meant that engineering micro-organisms that could reliably perform their intended function once 
released into the environment was very difficult. Participants agreed that synthetic biology would need to 
draw on expertise in ecology and soil microbiology not only to understand potential impacts and to 
inform the assessment of risk, but also in order to help improve the viability of products proposed for 
deliberate environmental release. 
One participant explained that one possible reason why some of the GM rhizobium biofertilisers that 
were developed failed to work was that researchers had initially started with microbial strains from their 
laboratory collections, rather than going out into the field to select natural isolates that would be better 
able to survive and compete. Several microbiologists argued that the failure of early efforts to produce 
GMMO agricultural applications led to the conclusion that it would be difficult to improve very much on 
micro-organisms that are naturally occurring. 
There was a general agreement that synthetic biology could also be used as a tool to understand 
ecosystems, but this part of the field is not widely promoted. One participant voiced their concern that 
instead of being used for this purpose, the field was in danger of being “hijacked” by an application-
driven route, and that this was what had already happened with GM techniques. 
Some participants argued that synthetic biology is a ‘technology looking for a problem’, i.e., it is 
starting with the tools and looking for ways to apply them, rather than looking at a problem and 
finding ways to solve it. 
The perception that synthetic biology was currently largely driven by applications was interlinked with 
discussions about the importance of understanding the problems being addressed. There was general 
agreement that synthetic biology offers great potential in terms of techniques and has attracted smart 
people, but some participants felt that in order to successfully apply those techniques, it is important to 
ask the right questions and use a broad range of expertise from the beginning in order to better understand 
the problem being addressed. 
Some participants suggested that synthetic biology might be making exaggerated claims about 
solving global challenges and cautioned that this could lead to undesirable effects: 
(1) disenchantment if promises are not met; (2) neglecting alternative approaches; (3) shaping the 
next generation of experts.  
Several participants suggested that the current focus on demonstration of impact in research grants can 
lead to applicants making exaggerated claims about the speed and scope of the future economic and social 
impact of their work. One participant also noted that the iGEM competition3 pushes students to think 
forward in a futuristic way, which leads to exciting and creative proposals, but could also result in a naive 
attitude towards the problem teams were trying to solve. Caution was urged about over-promising on the 
applications that synthetic biology can deliver, particularly in terms of environmental applications, as this 
could be damaging to the field in the long-term if the promises are not met. 
Some participants (especially those not engaged in synthetic biology research) also mentioned their 
perception that research councils in the UK would be more likely to fund projects that mentioned 
synthetic biology, and that this encourages existing areas of research to try to rebrand themselves as 
synthetic biology. They felt that this has an undesirable effect because it can lead to other interesting 
approaches being neglected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition is a competition for undergraduate students that has 
played a key role in the global development of the field of synthetic biology. Based on a kit of biological parts, teams work 
over the summer to design and build biological systems and operate them in living cells. See: www.igem.org 
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A participant gave an example of one such alternative approach: instead of trying to develop agricultural 
applications based on the release of a GMMO, it is now possible to use recent advances in molecular 
biology to better manage natural processes. For example, next generation sequencing and improvements 
in PCR techniques can be used to monitor how different agricultural management strategies affect whole 
microbial communities and the expression of genes of interest, such as those involved in the nitrogen 
cycle. It is also possible to go on “fishing expeditions” to collect naturally occurring microorganisms that 
may be able to perform particular functions. But this participant felt that such approaches would be less 
likely to be supported by public research funding bodies than synthetic biology approaches. 
Some participants felt that because synthetic biology is seen as a new and promising field, it is attracting 
young and smart researchers and that this means that fewer would want to study other fields such as 
microbiology or ecology, which are fundamentally important to understanding systems as a whole. These 
participants also expressed the view there was a difference between what they called “classical 
microbiology” training from decades ago and the new kind of education provided to molecular biology 
and synthetic biology students today. They felt that “classical microbiology” training was broader and 
provided a better understanding of living organisms and whole systems, which helped to produce people 
who could understand and adapt to new questions and problems throughout their working lives4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Following the workshop, some synthetic biologists have argued that, compared to other disciplines, synthetic biology 
students receive a very broad range of training from multiple disciplines including engineering, mathematics, microbiology, 
molecular biology, design, social science, ethics; and that the ‘human practices’ element of the iGEM competition provides 
an unusual and valuable extra dimension to synthetic biology education. 
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SESSION 2: Regulation for contained use and deliberate release of GMMOs 
This session explored how regulations in the USA, the EU and the UK distinguish between and deal 
with deliberate release and contained use of GMMOs. It also aimed to examine the way in which 
social and institutional factors challenge the regulatory distinction between deliberate release and 
contained use5. 
 
Presentation by Dr Mark Segal 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
“Synthetic Biology and the Coordinated Framework” 
The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology (1986) provides an umbrella for US 
regulations on biotechnology, with overlap of responsibilities among the agencies (FDA, EPA, USDA, OSHA, 
NIH). Genetically engineered micro-organisms for commercial products are regulated by the EPA Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), which was conceived for toxic chemicals and now also includes 
microorganisms. Through the Coordinated Framework policy statement and the TCSA Biotechnology Rule 
(1997), “new” micro-organisms were included as substances within the authority of TSCA. “New” or 
“intergeneric” micro-organisms are defined as those formed by deliberate combinations of genetic material that 
comes from organisms from different taxonomic genera; or constructed with synthetic genes that are not 
identical to DNA that would be derived from the same genus as the recipient microorganism. Naturally 
occurring micro-organisms, genetically engineered microorganisms other than intergeneric, and intergeneric 
organisms resulting only from the addition of well-characterised, non-coding regulatory regions are excluded 
from new microorganism review. Furthermore a number of application areas are excluded from the TSCA 
including pesticides, food, drugs, and cosmetics. 
Any manufacturer or importer of a new micro-organism must file a Microbial Commercial Activity Notice 
(MCAN) 90 days prior to initiating manufacture/import. Any person wishing to introduce a new micro-organism 
into the environment for commercial R&D purposes must submit a TSCA Experimental Release Application 
(TERA) 60 days prior to initiation of the field test. A risk assessment is conducted for human health and 
ecological impacts, as well as an economic analysis. The TSCA is a Risk/Benefit statute, which means that both 
risks and benefits are taken into account in the regulatory decision. This can take three routes: sufficient 
information to determine “no unreasonable risk”; sufficient information to determine “unreasonable risk”; or 
insufficient information to determine effects. 
A person who manufacturers, imports or processes a GMMO is not subject to MCAN reporting requirements if 
the activities are conducted inside a structure, defined as “a building or vessel which effectively surrounds and 
encloses the microorganism and includes features designed to restrict the microorganism from leaving.” The 
definition of “vessel” was left intentionally vague. The EPA has to anticipate all the possible uses of the new 
micro-organism, not only the uses that are described in the notification, because once approval has been granted, 
the organism can be used for any purpose, and/or by people other than the applicants. Research conducted in 
non-commercial settings generally does not fall under EPA oversight. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For further detail of these regulations and these issues, see the Scoping Report for this workshop. 
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Presentation by Dr Martin Cannell 
GM Team, UK Government Department for environment, food and rural affairs (Defra) 
“UK/EU regulations” 
Contained use of GMOs is regulated by EU Directive 2009/41/EC, and deliberate release is regulated by EU 
Directive 2001/18/EC, which were transcribed into UK Regulations in 2000 and 2002 respectively. There is 
extensive guidance for implementation of these regulations including “A guide to GMOs (Contained Use) 
Regulation 2000” and the “SACGM6 Compendium of Guidance on genetic modification”. The principles 
underlying the regulation of deliberate release are: that each GM organism release is considered on a case-by-
case basis; that the GMO is to be released in a stepwise fashion whereby the scale of the release increases and 
risk management decreases as knowledge about the GMO and its interaction with the environment increases; 
that decisions are based on an assessment of risk and associated risk management procedures; and that 
authorisation for placing on the market can only occur after adequate field testing in relevant ecosystems. The 
current regulatory appraisal system only considers the potential risks of a product and does not take into account 
potential benefits. 
Defra considers that the regulatory system is generally fit for purpose and able to capture the majority of 
synthetic biology applications, but blurred boundaries between contained use and deliberate release will likely 
need to be addressed as applications move beyond R&D and into the market. The Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) and Defra work closely together to address these blurred boundaries and applicants are encouraged to 
contact HSE and Defra to discuss these on a case-by-case basis. A recent gene therapy clinical trial was a case in 
which the decision about whether to regulate as contained use or deliberate release was unclear, because some 
shedding of the introduced genetic material from the patient was expected. The applicant contacted both the HSE 
and Defra and a pragmatic regulatory approach was devised collaboratively. Ultimately the deliberate release 
route was chosen. The environmental risk assessment was discussed by the Advisory Committee on Deliberate 
Release (ACRE), who advised that consent should be given because of the high level of biological containment. 
In light of the experience from this case, policy is being reviewed to consider whether clinical trials in which 
GMOs have a very high level of biological containment could be appropriately dealt with under the contained 
use regulations, irrespective of the degree of shedding. 
The case of the Wellcome Trust-funded arsenic biosensor project described in the workshop Scoping Report is 
also interesting in this respect. The researchers involved are attempting, with advice from Defra, to use a clause 
in Directive 2009/41 that raises the possibility of establishing a list of GMMOs that are considered safe enough 
to be exempt from the scope of the Directive7. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Scientific Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification. 
7 See workshop Scoping Report and http://www.arsenicbiosensor.org for details. 
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Presentation by Prof. Hauke Harms 
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research 
“The ARSOlux experience”8 
Researchers at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ) in Leipzig, Germany have developed a 
bacterial biosensor (Escherichia coli) to detect arsenic in ground water. The ARSOlux team patented the 
technology in 2003 and the first tests were conducted in Vietnam in 2005. In 2010 field tests were conducted in 
Bangladeshi villages. The product tested consisted of living GM bacteria contained in a sealed vial. The tests 
demonstrated good reliability as well as increased simplicity of use and reduced waste compared to competitor 
products using chemicals. However, while arsenic water contamination is a major health problem in Bangladesh, 
and despite having a reliable product and spending time speaking with government representatives in Germany 
and Bangladesh, the team have been unable to secure approval from the Bangladeshi government for commercial 
use of the device. The political instability in the country presented major challenges and the team are now 
exploring other potential markets. 
During their trips to Bangladesh, the team were frequently asked whether they had received regulatory approval 
to use the product in Germany. The team had not envisaged using their biosensor in Germany because arsenic 
water contamination is not a serious problem there, but in order to demonstrate their willingness to comply with 
regulatory authorities, the team sought approval for a field experiment in Saxony. This was granted under 
‘contained use’ regulations, and under the condition that the tests be conducted in a ‘lab in a van’ by trained 
scientists. 
Key lessons learned from the ARSOlux experience were that a GMMO product needs to demonstrate its unique 
or superior selling point, and that getting a product through to commercialisation takes time, money and stamina. 
The team is now working on a different product design, similar to a pregnancy test strip that changes colour 
when dipped in liquid. In this case, the aim would be for the product to be used by untrained people. With this 
product there is a greater probability of dispersal of the GMMOs because it would not have the same level of 
physical containment as the current ARSOlux product (as it would not be in a vial). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Participants discussed the relevance of physical containment for risk assessment of GMMOs.  
It was generally agreed that physical containment in a vial, as used for the ARSOlux product, can never 
be fail-safe: the vial might break, or local people may wish to reuse the vial, for their own purposes even 
if this goes against the instructions. For some participants this meant that the question ‘what might 
happen if and when it gets out?’ should be part of risk assessment conducted as part of the regulatory 
process. Others, who considered that the organism used by ARSOlux was inherently safe (since it uses a 
bacterial strain recognised by the German authorities as non pathogenic and able to survive only a limited 
time outside the laboratory), thought that a request for further evidence of safety would be excessive; and 
that some low level of relative risk should be considered acceptable. In response, one participant wanted 
to know what tests had been conducted to demonstrate the safety of the strain, and whether the data had 
been made publicly available for peer review. For this participant considering what might happen if a 
GMMO escaped from physical containment was particularly important because of the ability of living 
organisms to replicate and/or pass on the altered genetic information.  
One participant introduced the idea of ‘geographical containment’, suggesting that release of GMMOs 
should be prevented in particularly sensitive or valuable geographical areas. 
Participants discussed the importance of the context of use in determining whether a device 
constituted ‘contained use’ or ‘deliberate release’ 
Several participants remarked that the level of training of the user and the social and institutional 
conditions in which the measurement was conducted when the ARSOlux biosensor was field tested in 
Germany was very different to the envisaged goal of providing the device to villagers in Bangladesh. 
Although the German field trials conducted by scientists in a lab-in-a-van were defined as ‘contained use’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Slides for this presentation are not available. For further information see: http://www.ufz.de/arsolux and the Scoping Report 
for this workshop. 
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this did not necessarily mean that the use of the same device by different users and in a different social 
context would or should also be considered as ‘contained use’ by regulatory authorities. 
The importance of assessing benefits as well as risks was stressed by many participants, for various 
reasons: (1) it could help speed up regulatory decisions for applications with seemingly obvious 
humanitarian benefits; (2) it could help challenge unwarranted claims about benefits; and (3) it 
could help open up deliberations about the nature of benefits. 
The idea that the US regulatory procedure includes an economic analysis and takes into account benefits 
as well as risks, whereas the EU/UK procedure currently only considers potential risks, was discussed at 
some length. Many participants argued that there should be more of an emphasis on benefits in the EU 
regulatory process, although there were different perspectives about what this might achieve. Some 
participants suggested this would help to get synthetic biology applications through the regulatory system 
where they appear to have obvious humanitarian benefits. Others argued that a methodological 
assessment could challenge unwarranted claims about the problem at stake, as well as raise questions 
such as: who benefits, and under what circumstances? What alternative approaches exist or could be 
developed to deliver these benefits? How can we conduct a fair comparison between different options? 
One participant remarked that socio-economic assessment of benefits (and risks) has been discussed for 
some time at the European Commission, where it is sometimes referred to as ‘the fourth hurdle’, and was 
nearly included in the EC Directive for deliberate release in 19909. Such assessments would require novel 
types of trans-disciplinary research. Referring back to discussions earlier in the day about ‘technologies in 
search of a problem’ and the way in which research funding decisions influence which approaches are 
likely to be developed, this participant argued that socio-economic assessment of benefits could perhaps 
help redirect research towards technologies that would work in realistic conditions, and to identify the 
conditions necessary to reliably deliver benefits. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A European Socio-Economic Bureau for GMOs (ESEB) was recently established by the European Commission. For further 
details see “Summary report for the Workshop ‘Framing socio-economic assessment in GMO & chemicals regulation’, 
European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, 6-7 December 2012” available at: 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/umweltsituation/gentechnik/gentechnik_termine/socio-economics-gmoschemicals/ 
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SESSION 3: Horizontal gene transfer and engineered biocontainment 
This session examined the engineering approaches to biocontainment that have been proposed since 
the 1970s by microbiologists and synthetic biologists and explored the extent to which they provide 
solutions to biosafety concerns. 
 
Presentation by Dr Ollie Wright 
CSynBI, Imperial College London 
“Built-in biosafety design” 10 
Two key biosafety concerns relating to the release of GMMOs into the environment were identified at the 1975 
Asilomar Conference: GMMOs might outcompete indigenous organisms; and genetic contamination might 
occur through horizontal gene transfer (HGT). These biosafety issues are actively discussed within the synthetic 
biology community, and a number of built-in biocontainment measures have been proposed to prevent HGT and 
dispersal. Several iGEM teams have focused on this issue, for example the Paris Bettencourt 2012 team bWARE 
project that proposed a triple biosafety system including different ‘kill switches’. A weakness of such systems is 
that organisms need only a few mutations to inactivate a toxicity-causing device. A gain-of-function is much 
harder to achieve evolutionarily than a loss-of-function, and this should be taken into account in biosafety 
designs. 
Transformation (sequence-independent uptake of free DNA from the environment) is harder to mitigate than 
conjugation (active transfer via pili) or transduction (active transfer via bacteriophages) mechanisms for HGT. 
Minimising genes with an obvious selection advantage and including genes with an obvious selection 
disadvantage could improve biosafety. Flanking sequences should be as different as possible form naturally 
occurring sequences to minimise the chance of homologous recombination into other genomes. It would also be 
best to use microbes that do not survive long when released into the environment (e.g. with multiple 
attenuations) rather than relying on kill switches. Semantic containment (e.g. shuffling of the genetic code, xeno-
nucleic acids) was also mentioned as a future biosafety mechanism. 
Monitoring rates of HGT in bacterial populations is challenging due to the large sample sizes or long timeframes 
required when looking for these rare events; if the selection coefficient is weak, the time required to infer the 
occurrence of a HGT event may be 10 to 1,000+ years. As a test-bed for the efficacy of biosafety designs, a 
strong selection coefficient for HGT should be incorporated into a worst-case-scenario laboratory trial. 
In conclusion it was suggested that it is important to incorporate multiple biosafety mechanisms in order to 
ensure system redundancy, whilst minimising the fitness cost to the GMMO product; and that systems based on 
full deletions and complementations were preferable to those based on more minor inactivation of a gene. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Further details are available in Wright, O., Stan, G.-B., & Ellis, T. (2013). “Building-in Biosafety for Synthetic Biology.” 
Microbiology, 159: 1221-1235. 
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Presentation by Prof. Pascal Simonet, 
Environmental Microbial Genomics Group, Ecole Centrale de Lyon 
“Horizontal gene transfer in the environment” 
The important question for applications involving environmental release of GMMOs is how to make organisms 
that will actually survive and persist effectively in the environment in order to perform their intended function. 
Natural ecosystems are complex, with many different microbes interacting. Almost all the attention in risk 
research, risk assessment and policy discussions has been and still is about how to make sure the genetically 
engineered organisms do not survive, persist, and ‘take over’ natural ecosystems: ‘the superbug question’. 
However, this is the wrong question. The right question is: how can we make efficient and competitive micro-
organisms that can perform their intended job in a hostile natural environment? Currently ‘natural’ microbes are 
better at doing that than GM microbes. 
Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) is a necessary and critical mechanism for adaptation and evolution. One example 
to demonstrate the importance and versatility of HGT comes from bacteria that are able to produce a great 
variety of polyketide antibiotics by shuffling and transferring gene domains among bacterial populations. The 
functional diversity of the variants of polyketides produced by natural bacteria is much greater than for 
chemically synthesised molecules generated by random chemistry. 
A second example is the detection of a bacterium (Sphingobium francense) that is able to degrade lindane, a 
toxic pesticide, in highly polluted soils. Lindane was first synthesised in 1946 and no similar compound is found 
in nature, so these bacteria must have evolved a new metabolic pathway to degrade it. Such degradative bacteria 
cannot be detected in non-polluted soil. The degradative bacteria contain a linA gene that is involved in the first 
and essential step in the metabolic pathway. Research has demonstrated that this is not an ancestral gene that has 
been reactivated, but rather an entirely new mosaic gene, created by assembling four DNA fragments acquired 
via HGT from other bacteria. This process required numerous transfer events over a short period of time (a few 
years) and demonstrates how HGT is involved in rapid (but not optimised) responses to new environmental 
conditions. This illustrates two possible targets for synthetic biology: de novo generation of new functions, or 
optimisation (fine tuning) of the products of natural evolution. It would have been very difficult for humans to 
design a new metabolic pathway and the associated linA gene, but synthetic biology tools could be used to 
optimise it. 
There are three types of barriers to HGT in situ: physical (contact between recipient and donor organisms, or 
their DNA), physiological (active metabolism of donor and recipient bacteria), and genetic. A crucial criterion 
for HGT is the presence of homologous DNA sequences that create ‘hot spots’ for gene transfer. When the first 
risk assessments for GM crops were conducted in the 1990s, it was assumed that there could be no transfer of 
genetic material between a GM plant and soil bacteria, but this has now been shown to occur, through 
homologous recombination.  
HGT, especially among bacterial populations, is unavoidable. HGT is the main adaptive weapon of the best 
adaptable organisms on this planet. Engineered safety mechanisms based on genetic devices can reduce the 
probability of HGT but cannot eliminate it. Multiple devices may increase biosafety efficiency but will never 
offer a total guarantee. Moreover, as pointed out by Wright et al., the higher the complexity of the safety device, 
the higher the physiological burden on the host and in turn the higher selective pressure to circumvent the 
biosafety mechanism. 
The fact that HGT is unavoidable does not, however, mean that negative impacts on the environment will be 
high. The impact is likely to be negligible because wild bacteria are too strong. The high taxonomic and 
functional microbial diversity in the environment, the heterogeneity and complexity of natural media, and the 
harsh selective pressure that bacteria and other micro-organisms face make it difficult for man-made micro-
organisms to outcompete native species and disrupt habitats. 
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DISCUSSION 
There was general agreement that engineered biocontainment based on built-in genetic designs 
may be able to decrease, but could not completely eliminate, the frequency of Horizontal Gene 
Transfer (HGT) and the likelihood of persistence and dispersal of released micro-organisms. 
Participants had different opinions about the implications this has for the role of engineered 
biocontainment for biosafety. 
There was general agreement that built-in genetic designs for biocontainment could never be fail-safe: 
they may be able to decrease, but could not completely eliminate, the frequency of Horizontal Gene 
Transfer (HGT) and the likelihood of persistence and dispersal of released micro-organisms. Bacterial 
populations have well-known mechanisms, including HGT, that can enable them to evolve and 
circumvent biosafety designs. Therefore, given high enough population numbers and/or long enough 
timescales, bacteria may override any kind of ‘kill switch’. Participants had different opinions about the 
implications this has for the role of engineered biocontainment for biosafety. For some participants, the 
focus should be on trying to improve genetic biocontainment designs and to better quantify the incidence 
of HGT using mathematical models and/or field experiments. Others suggested the focus should shift 
towards research to evaluate the potential consequences on human health and the environment if HGT 
occurred and/or the GMMO did persist or disperse following the deliberate release of a specific GMMO 
into the environment. Some synthetic biologists thought that biocontainment could, in circumstances 
where the potential negative environmental impact of HGT or dispersal was assessed as low, be 
considered an appropriate approach to help maximise biosafety. Other participants (including NGOs, 
microbiologists and regulators) stressed that engineered biocontainment is not by itself an adequate 
biosafety approach. Regulators present emphasised that the key question for risk assessment was to assess 
whether or not the GMMO released could be associated with potential harm, , and that HGT in itself does 
not constitute a hazard11. 
The discussion, in this session and throughout the day, illustrated that there is a balance to be 
reached between making GMMOs survive long enough in the environment to perform their 
intended function, and aiming to contain the released organisms and the inserted or modified 
genetic material in order to reduce the potential for environmental harm. 
There was a general agreement that most of the attention in risk research, risk assessment and policy 
discussions surrounding environmental risks has focused on how to make sure that the genetically 
engineered organisms released into the environment (or other organisms that pick up their genetic 
material) do not survive and ‘take over’ natural ecosystems, i.e. ‘the superbug question’. Some 
participants suggested that this might be the wrong question and that the real challenge is how to create 
micro-organisms that could compete well enough with pre-existing bacterial populations in order to 
perform reliably and effectively in the environment. This was essential for the GMMOs to deliver their 
intended benefits and/or to be of commercial interest. 
A number of participants argued that there was a case for developing GMMO applications that would 
specifically not need to be able to compete effectively with wild bacterial populations, either because they 
were physically contained (e.g. in bioreactors or glass vials), or because they would only be required to 
survive for short periods in the environment. For some participants, the key advantage of such 
containment or ‘semi-containment’ is that the environment can be controlled to some extent, and that this 
would help ensure the viability of GMMOs as useful products. Others focused on semi-containment as a 
means to help ensure safety. 
Participants discussed the difference between product-based and process-based regulations and 
their implications for how GMOs are treated differently by US and EU/UK regulatory systems. 
The example of the linA gene demonstrated how natural selection can lead to elegant solutions to 
problems and led to discussions about how synthetic biologists could perhaps accelerate such processes in 
the lab, or in field environments especially designed to increase selection pressure and encourage HGT. 
This raised the question of whether, in such cases, the resulting organisms would be classified as GMOs 
according to existing regulations. Regulators responded by saying that boundaries between GM and 
‘naturally’ selected organisms have been discussed at length since the 1990s, especially in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In UK and EU regulations HGT is not defined as a hazard in itself but rather as a mechanism through which adverse effects 
could occur. See Scoping Report for further detail and discussion. 
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plants12. In the US, it is mostly the end use of the product that determines whether and by which agency a 
GMO is regulated; and if the genes inserted are present in other organisms from the same genera then the 
engineered organism does not fall within the scope of EPA Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). In the 
EU, it is mostly the process used to insert the genes which determines whether an organism falls under 
GMO regulations. Thus, an organism defined as a “GMMO” within UK/EU regulations will not 
necessarily be defined as an “intergeneric micro-organism” within US regulations13. 
For some participants, these regulatory definitions appeared to be somewhat illogical, and they could 
think of examples of organisms that could be produced by laboratory researchers that would fall outside 
the scope of US and/or EU regulations, and yet would not necessarily be inherently less hazardous. A 
regulator remarked that some companies were indeed thought to be seeking to exploit such gaps to find 
ways to escape regulatory oversight, but that this was not advisable. Another participant suggested that 
even if regulations have slightly illogical ‘triggers’ to bring things into the review system, this is not 
necessarily a significant problem: sometimes regulations will catch things that are not problematic and 
those cases can get through the system quite swiftly, and things that are not captured by GM regulations 
can perhaps be effectively captured by other regulations to assess their safety. 
Participants discussed the relative weight that should be given to knowledge about DNA sequences 
when assessing environmental risk 
One participant expressed concern that risk assessments were too narrowly based on knowledge of linear 
DNA sequences, which is not sufficient to judge harmfulness. They noted that the same genes placed in 
different organisms or different contexts have been known to function differently, so it is not possible to 
reliably predict how a known gene sequence will behave in a new genetic and cellular environment. On 
the other hand, another participant argued that knowledge about the DNA sequence inserted into the 
engineered organism was the most crucial piece of information, and furthermore that if such a sequence is 
already present in the environment then harm is unlikely to occur. 
One participant stressed the need to take into account radical uncertainty 
A social scientist pointed out that we are in a situation in which we need to act in the face of “radical 
uncertainty”14. There are examples of innovations that were assumed to be safe and then were shown to 
cause serious environmental harm, and we can learn lessons from these cases. This participant insisted 
that this is not about being ‘for’ or ‘against’ synthetic biology, and is not about stifling innovation. 
Innovation systems are complex, just like soil microbiology, and a rigorous balanced approach to dealing 
with knowledge in conditions of uncertainty is needed. It is important to take care not to speak in 
particular ways that have become routine and which have caused problems in the past, in particular: (1) 
assume that when something is ‘natural’, it is necessarily safe; (2) assume that if something is ‘low risk’, 
we can go ahead; (3) assume that containment is always possible and is an appropriate solution to 
uncertainty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The question then was whether and how to distinguish between conventional plant breeding and GM techniques to produce 
crops. 
13 See workshop Scoping Report for further details. 
14 The term “radical uncertainty” was used here to refer to the concept first proposed by Frank Knight in 1921 (in his book 
Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit) and further elaborated since then by other scholars in economics and social studies of science 
and technology (Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne, Stirling). For a discussion, see Stirling, A. 
(2010). “Keep it Complex.” Nature, 468: 1029-1031. 
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SESSION 4: Broader perspectives on risk and uncertainty 
This session examined current governance frameworks dealing with risk and uncertainty and how any 
limitations could be addressed. 
 
Presentation by Dr Ricarda Steinbrecher 
Econexus 
“Perspectives on risk and uncertainty” 
The talk began with a list of historical examples, demonstrating that risk assessments and decisions for GMOs 
have at times been based on unproven assumptions, false predictions and lack of knowledge. For example 
‘naked’ DNA was initially assumed not to persist in the environment, but it has now been shown that it can 
survive for long periods in certain situations. rDNA techniques for GM crops were assumed to be precise, and 
when combined with the knowledge of the DNA sequence inserted, this was assumed to lead to increased safety, 
but this ignored transformation-induced mutation effects across the plant genome and at the insertion site, that 
resulted in imprecision and unpredictability15. Another example was the Cauliflower Mosaic Virus (CaMV) 35S 
promoter, widely used for GM crops. It was initially assumed that this promoter, because of its plant virus 
origin, was not functional in bacteria and thus that even if HGT occurred from GM crops to bacteria, genes that 
were driven by that promoter would not be expressed. Statements asserting this continued to be made by EU and 
UK advisory bodies and be used in risk assessments submitted to regulatory authorities for GM plants, even after 
a number of articles were published demonstrating CaMV 35S promoter activity in bacteria, yeast and human 
cells (see examples in slides)16. More recently it has also been demonstrated that the 35S promoter unexpectedly 
contains an open reading frame. Paying attention to these examples is not about being ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ GMOs, but 
about doing good science and checking facts. It is also about addressing uncertainty as a crucial and scientific 
component in risk assessment. 
The ‘Push-Pull’17 technology widely used in East Africa to tackle stem borer infestations and the parasitic Striga 
weed is a good example of a locally researched system-based approach. In contrast to approaches based on using 
an isolated compound such as strigolactone (which may lead to altered responses and undesirable effects on 
mycorrhiza), it takes into account the whole complex agro-ecosystem, provides a range of side benefits (e.g. the 
provision of all-round quality fodder for livestock, nitrogen fixation and reduced soil erosion) and provides a 
more sustainable solution. Similarly the use of artemisinin as an isolated compound to treat malaria is likely to 
lead to resistance problems, whereas remedies based on whole Artemisia plants can be more effective and are 
reported to be less likely to lead to resistance. 
Biological containment should not be thought of as contained use, because biological measures can be overcome 
by the organisms and are therefore not reliable. Biocontainment strategies developed for plants (Genetic Use 
Restriction Technologies, GURTs), insects (Release of Insects containing a Dominant Lethal, RIDL) and fish 
(triploidy) have claimed sterility but in practice they have not achieved it reliably. 
There is a tendency for synthetic biology to over-simplify, to treat living systems as if dealing with mechanical 
systems, to focus on technology as the only solution to a problem, and to ignore locally-researched solutions, 
root causes and system solutions. There is also a tendency to think that the availability of technological answers 
means that we do not need to change our human behaviours that are causing the problem, for example focusing 
on bioremediation rather than reducing pollution. ‘Techno solutions’ that focus on symptoms ignore surrounding 
systems and as a result are often unreliable and short-lived, and lead to another layer of problems that can be 
even harder to deal with. ‘System solutions’ are more durable and sustainable in the long term, but require a very 
different approach. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For further details see: Wilson AK, Latham JR and Steinbrecher RA (2006). “Transformation-induced Mutations in 
Transgenic Plants - Analysis and Biosafety Implications.” Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering Reviews, 23: 209-237 
16 For further details see: Steinbrecher RA (Dec. 2002). The CaMV 35S promoter. EcoNexus Briefing. 
http://www.econexus.info/sites/econexus/files/ENx-CaMV-35S-Promoter-B-2002.pdf  
17 See workshop Scoping Report for the description of a synthetic biology based approach to tackling Striga, and this website 
for more information about the Push-Pull technology: http://www.push-pull.net/striga.shtml 
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Presentation by Prof. Andy Stirling 
SPRU, Sussex University18 
“Risk, uncertainty… and the governance of technology” 
The presenter began by stressing that he is not being specifically critical of synthetic biology, but wanted to talk 
about some general implications of power, which, though very real, are often not spoken about because they are 
thought to be impolite. For instance, government strategies proclaim ‘pro-innovation’ policies as if innovation 
moves forward on a single linear track in any particular technological field, with no effective alternative 
pathways. Being critical of any particular path for science and technology, such as synthetic biology, is treated as 
if counter to progress itself. But the choice is not about being ‘for’ or ‘against’ innovation. Innovation does not 
just have speed, it also has direction: there are choices to be made between different options. Key questions are: 
which way should we go? Says who? Why? 
Science and technology takes place in political, economic and social systems. Innovation is an irreversibly 
branching evolutionary process, and the regulatory system we have been discussing is part of this innovation 
system. As a result, not all that is scientifically realistic, technically practicable, economical feasible or socially 
viable will be historically realisable. As certain options are closed down, certain technology pathways get 
‘locked-in’ and choice can become artificially closed. 
Risk is a narrow concept, and is radically different from uncertainty. Risk approaches are appropriate only when 
knowledge about likelihoods is unproblematic (e.g. for high frequency incidents in familiar contexts). Such cases 
are, however, rare in practice and it is necessary to move beyond a narrow focus on risk. Current regulatory 
practice tends to focus on risk and as such fails to address situations of ambiguity, uncertainty and ignorance. In 
situations of uncertainty, knowledge about likelihoods is problematic (e.g. low frequency events or where human 
factors and changing contexts play an important role). In situations of ambiguity, knowledge about likelihoods 
may be unproblematic but disagreements exist about what matters, and what counts as ‘harm’ and ‘benefit’. This 
leads to a different set of questions. Rather than taking one product and asking ‘is this safe?’, or ‘is this at least 
no worse that the least safe existing comparator?’, we might ask ‘which alternatives would be best?’ and ‘what 
kind of society do we want to live in?’. Ignorance occurs in situations where knowledge about both likelihoods 
and possibilities is problematic. Here we have surprises, and sometimes also wilful blinkers. 
Science-based regulatory systems, political culture, liability, insurance, and over-emphasis on metrics and 
quantitative methods all tend to push practices and policies away from dealing with ignorance, ambiguity and 
uncertainty, and towards treating problems only in terms of risk. We are in what sociologist Ulrich Beck has 
called a state of “organised irresponsibility”. 
A narrow focus on risk leads to attention being placed mostly on measuring and modelling probabilities of 
adverse events and ensuring that identified risks are ‘low’, with a focus on prediction (‘more numbers’) and 
(bio)containment. Complexity and uncertainty should be acknowledged by scientists, and within the regulatory 
process. Paying more attention to irreducible uncertainties leads to more attention on acknowledging 
unpredictability, un-containability, irretrievability and irreversibility, which in turn leads to seeking new 
procedures for decision making that are more transparent, plural and democratic. 
A narrow risk approach demands definitive prescription, whereas a reflexive, precautionary and participatory 
approach to governance opens up more options, issues, uncertainties and perspectives, and seeks to reconcile 
scientific rigour and democratic accountability. Experts are often expected to give definitive answers, but a 
scientifically rigorous answer will often be ‘it depends on how you look at the question’. This also means that a 
shift is needed from risk governance to innovation governance. And we should not feel so anxious about 
terminating one avenue when there are better alternatives. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For further details see Stirling, A. (2010). “Keep it Complex.” Nature, 468: 1029-1031. 
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DISCUSSION 
One synthetic biologist was unhappy that synthetic biologists seem to be cast as seeking to 
“technologize” solutions to all of the world’s problems. 
This participant acknowledged that solutions based on isolated compounds may perhaps be problematic 
in some cases (e.g. Striga), but not in others. They also enquired whether there was evidence to 
demonstrate that the semi-synthetic artemisinin was more likely to lead to resistance than other malaria 
treatments19. They argued that they, as a synthetic biologist, were interested in comparing their envisaged 
synthetic-biology-based solution with alternative approaches. 
The discussion returned to earlier themes about over-promising and the role of funding bodies in 
shaping research priorities. Some participants suggested that funding mechanisms needed to be 
developed for technology assessment and trans-disciplinary research. 
The tendency to make bold promises in grant application was again brought up. However, it was pointed 
out by one participant that funding applications do go through peer review processes and reviewers do 
question overly-fanciful claims, which can lead to those applications being declined. 
It was noted by one participant that data on how much public money in the UK is devoted to different 
science and technology streams is not available, despite this evidence being requested in a House of 
Lords Select Committee Report in 201020; and this data would be essential for better and more transparent 
deliberations about research priorities. In addition, 25-50% (depending on the definition used  and sources 
of information) of global research funding comes from military institutions and even less data is publicly 
available about this. 
Participants suggested that funding mechanisms needed to be developed for technology assessment (TA) 
and trans-disciplinary research to identify the challenges that need to be addressed and open up 
comparative analysis of different approaches, rather than taking one single technology and seeking the 
best way to develop it to market. One participant suggested that a proportion of research funding should 
be set aside for TA, even if this meant less funding for scientific research. They remarked that it is 
accepted that scientific research to produce innovation will take years, but rigorous evidence to inform 
policy is expected to be generated instantly. Another participant cautioned that it would be important to 
ensure that the TA methods used did not close down options. 
In a recent Technology Strategy Board (TSB) funded feasibility studies competition, £0.5 million had 
been set aside by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for social science research, but 
none of the applications received contained relevant components so the money was not allocated. Some 
participants suggested that this could be due to the requirement that projects be business led. One social 
scientist argued that the remit of that specific TSB call was too restrictive, in that it asked only ‘how 
should we implement particular applications of synthetic biology?’ rather than encouraging questions 
about why synthetic biology is the most appropriate approach and what alternatives may be available. 
Another social scientist argued that we undermine science when we fail to recognise its versatility and 
that research needs to ask ‘what are the right challenges?’. In order to do this, we would need genuinely 
trans-disciplinary kinds of research (not just social science research). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In her talk, Ricarda Steinbrecher made a contrast between malaria treatments based on whole Artemisia plants and 
treatments based on the isolated artemisinin compound, regardless of whether the artemisinin drug was produced via 
synthetic biology, and regardless of whether or not it was administered as a combination therapy with a second isolated 
pharmaceutical compound. Subsequent discussion revealed that this point was largely misheard, with synthetic biologists 
believing that the critique was targeted at semi-synthetic artemisinin produced via synthetic biology as opposed to the same 
compound extracted from the plant. 
20 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (2010). Setting Priorities for publicly funded research. 3rd Report of 
Session 2009-10. Stationary Office: London. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldsctech/104/104i.pdf  
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SESSION 5: General discussion 
The session began by asking the synthetic biologists present to provide their comments on the 
discussion so far. Some of the points mentioned by one or several synthetic biologists were: 
• They had found discussions about the regulatory definitions of ‘GMOs’ and ‘intergeneric organisms’ 
informative. 
• The historical examples provided useful context. 
• They recognised the need to acknowledge uncertainty and to consider the views of different 
stakeholders. 
• They appreciated that turning proposed environmental applications into real world products is a 
challenge, and that the proposed benefits, as well as the wider environment, need to be taken into 
consideration alongside technical feasibility. 
 
Discussion of ‘broader questions’ and responsibility 
Almost all the synthetic biologists used this opportunity to return to themes relating to what they referred 
to as ‘broader issues’, ‘big questions’ and ‘social impacts’, and to the critique that synthetic biology was a 
‘technology looking for a problem’. This led to a wide-ranging discussion about responsibility. 
The synthetic biologists generally agreed that there were real and important ‘broader questions’ about the 
purpose of their work, but argued that this was not unique to synthetic biology, and queried whether they, 
as research scientists working at the bench, should be expected to address these broader questions. For 
example, putting Artemisia farmers out of business, or considering which forms of artemisinin treatment 
is more likely to lead to resistance are real issues, but a number of synthetic biologists present thought 
that these considerations were beyond the remit of their jobs and/or beyond their realm of expertise. 
Another synthetic biologist took a slightly different position and argued that these broader issues cannot 
be ignored if research is being taken beyond the bench to product development. This participant 
suggested that this has to be done by working with people with other kinds of relevant knowledge (e.g. 
microbial ecologists). 
The allegation that synthetic biology is a ‘technology looking for a problem’ was contested by one 
synthetic biologist who viewed this as an unwarranted criticism of the field. He noted that there were 
historical examples of technologies (e.g. lasers) that were developed by scientific researchers who did not 
and could not have anticipated the wide-ranging applications that resulted in the long term. 
These opening remarks from synthetic biologists led to a discussion with the whole group about whether 
it is fair or appropriate to expect synthetic biologists to address all the social implications of their work, 
and whether and how others (social scientists and/or stakeholders) should be involved. Some synthetic 
biologists felt that they were being asked to be personally responsible for all the implications of their 
work, but social scientists and NGO representatives clarified that they did not wish synthetic biologists to 
be solely responsible for all impacts of their research when working at the bench and focused instead on 
the responsibility of synthetic biologists who are promoting the field to temper their claims and to 
acknowledge uncertainty. One social scientist pointed out, however, that some scientists also play 
important and privileged roles outside of their laboratories (e.g. when participating in public debates or 
sitting on regulatory and advisory committees), and suggested that in those cases they should assume 
more responsibility. 
A social scientist pointed out that when scientists and others speak (outside of the laboratory setting) to 
promote a particular field, conditionals tend to disappear. So “synthetic biology could…” quickly changes 
to “synthetic biology can…” and then to “synthetic biology will…”. This way of speaking is part of the 
problem, as it makes it more difficult to ask questions about: benefits to whom? Under what conditions? 
And with what downsides? 
A social scientist acknowledged that social science also has its own hype, but that this is perhaps not so 
problematic because social scientists appropriate far less resources and their claims are seldom taken as 
seriously. 
One participant pointed out that the current UK government had identified synthetic biology as a key area 
for public investment, with many millions of pounds now committed to the field. This is a great 
opportunity for synthetic biology, but could also be seen as detrimental to the field, because it leads to 
greater pressure to deliver successful commercial applications in the short-term. 
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Uncertainty 
The final part of the discussion returned to the issue of uncertainty. One participant argued that regulatory 
and policy discussion did not focus enough on uncertainty. For example, we should accept that 
containment is leaky, and be prepared for surprises. In response, a synthetic biologist asked whether this 
meant that there should be more research to determine the probability of HGT. A social scientist argued 
that uncertainty tends to get dropped when science is used for policy, and that advisory science is not 
good at addressing ‘unknown unknowns’. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This workshop did not seek to arrive at consensual views or to generate specific recommendations, but 
the executive summary draws together the main themes that emerged during the day. A key aim of this 
workshop was to promote constructive discussion and better mutual understanding on the prospect for 
synthetic biology that would require release into the environment, between actors with very different 
perspectives. Feedback received from participants (see below) suggests that this aim was achieved. 
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Feedback	  received	  
A feedback questionnaire was distributed and very positive feedback was received from workshop 
participants, with many comments focusing on the diverse mix of speakers and participants, and the 
value of bringing together people with different backgrounds and perspectives. Comments also 
focused on the clear aims and structure of the workshop agenda, which enabled interesting, open and 
constructive discussion. However, it was also suggested that the workshop could have been longer in 
order to take the discussion further. 
Some of the key themes identified in the feedback received were: the complexities involved in 
regulatory definitions of contained use and deliberate release; the need to acknowledge the complexity 
of the environment; the importance of acknowledging uncertainty; and the role of wider stakeholder 
participation. Two thirds of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their participation in the 
workshop will have an impact on their future work. 
 
Responses to the question “What was best aspect of the workshop?” 
“Good mix of people, important to have ‘real’ microbiologists.” (Policy analyst) 
“Mix of speakers - different backgrounds and perspectives. Lots of discussion time. Clear aims, good 
construction of agenda.” (NGO) 
“The speakers mix” (Synthetic biologist) 
“Diversity of contributors” (Regulator) 
“Open discussion” (Microbiologist) 
“Very interesting talks plenty of time for discussion. Very interesting and useful discussion.” (Synthetic 
Biologist/Microbiologist) 
“Structure” (Synthetic biologist) 
“General forum to bring together scientists from different fields, regulators, NGOs with significant expertise in 
a very constructive atmosphere; no agenda for discussion - free development.” (Regulator/Microbiologist) 
“The willingness of different groups to listen to each other” (Social scientist) 
“Time for discussion in addition to formal talks” (Microbiologist) 
“Respectful, open discourse.” (Research funder) 
“Level of discussion between participants, which was excellent and informative” (Synthetic biologist) 
 
Other comments received 
“Of all the workshops on Synthetic Biology I have attended, I think yours was one of the most productive. I think 
that the case studies, especially the one on arsenic detection, might have been better chosen, but that said, it 
think they helped draw out the major questions.” (NGO) 
“I found the day extremely interesting and it was a pleasure and privilege to be involved. It was a very unusual 
mix of disciplinary positions and orientations with respect to the politics of synbio. Yet the evidently careful 
thinking about who was involved on what basis (and in what sequence) helped to build a conversation that – 
whilst addressing some of the most tricky issues – avoided the usual barricades. I particularly valued the 
conversations that took place in the wing and afterwards. Although these divergent perspectives present 
persistent challenges and there remains unreconciled diversity and contention, I felt that the workshop did go 
some useful way towards building greater mutual understanding. Since positive ways forward rest more on the 
mutually respectful exploration of difference, than on the engineering of consensus, the workshop was a very 
useful further step.” (Social scientist) 
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PROGRAMME FOR THE WORKSHOP 
 
9:30-9:50 Registration 
 
9:50-10:00 Welcome and Introduction – Claire Marris 
 
10:00-11:00 Session 1: Learning from past experiences with released GMMOs 
 Chair: Tom Ellis 
 Penny Hirsch - GM rhizobium inoculants as biofertilisers (15 minutes) 
 Ian Thompson - Field release of free-living GM bacteria (15 minutes) 
 DISCUSSION (30 minutes) 
Key questions: Why did genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMOs) aimed at tackling environmental and 
agricultural challenges fail to develop into successful products in the 1990s? 
 And how might synthetic biology overcome those challenges? 
 
11:00-12:30 Session 2: Regulation for contained use and deliberate release of GMMOs 
 Chair: Ollie Wright 
 Mark Segal - US regulations (15 minutes) 
 Martin Cannell - UK/EU regulations (15 minutes) 
 Hauke Harms - ARSOlux experiences (15 minutes) 
 DISCUSSION (45 minutes) 
Key questions: How do regulations in the USA, the EU and the UK distinguish between and deal with 
deliberate release and contained use of GMMOs?  
How might this evolve if synthetic biology is successful in producing a spectrum of 
applications that involve GMMOs that require deliberate release to perform their function? 
 How do local social and institutional factors blur the regulatory distinction between deliberate 
release and contained use; and how should this affect decision-making? 
 
12:30-13:30 LUNCH 
 
13:30-14:30 Session 3 - Horizontal gene transfer and engineered biocontainment 
Chair: Catherine Jefferson 
Ollie Wright - Built-in biosafety design (15 minutes) 
Pascal Simonet - Horizontal gene transfer in the environment (15 minutes) 
 DISCUSSION (30 minutes) 
Key questions: What engineering approaches to biocontainment have been proposed by synthetic biologists 
and to what extent do they provide solutions to biosafety concerns? 
 
14:30-15:30 Session 4 - Broader perspectives on risk and uncertainty 
 Chair: Guy-Bart Stan 
 Ricarda Steinbrecher - Perspectives from an environmental NGO (15 minutes) 
 Andy Stirling - Risk, uncertainty and the governance of technology (15 minutes) 
 DISCUSSION (30 minutes) 
Key questions: What are the limitations of current governance frameworks for dealing with risk and 
uncertainty and how could they be addressed? 
 
15:30-16:00 BREAK 
 
16:00-17:30 General discussion 
 Chair: Claire Marris 
 
17:30 END 
 
17:30-19:30 Reception  
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Aim: 
To explore the prospects for synthetic biology applications for environmental and agricultural purposes that 
would require the intentional use of engineered micro-organisms outside of laboratories and large-scale 
industrial installations, including issues related to regulatory appraisal, environmental risk assessment, and risk 
reduction measures proposed by synthetic biologists. 
 
Objectives: 
1. Explore past experiences with the deliberate release of engineered micro-organisms for environmental and 
agricultural purposes from the period 1990-2005, when there was much hope in this area. 
2. Generate a better understanding among UK synthetic biologists of existing UK/EU and US risk regulations 
that currently apply to synthetic biology applications for both 'contained use' and 'deliberate release' of 
genetically modified micro-organisms into the environment. 
3. Explore how existing UK/EU/US regulatory frameworks would apply to synthetic biology applications 
involving engineered micro-organisms that perhaps fall in between strict 'contained use' and full blown 
'deliberate release'. 
4. Explore the potential contribution to risk reduction of technical approaches using synthetic biology for 
'biological containment' to prevent horizontal gene transfer. 
5. Promote a constructive discussion on these issues between different actors, including synthetic biologists, 
scientists from other relevant fields, regulators, social scientists and environmental NGOs. 
 
Format: 
Participation in the workshop was by invitation only, and numbers were kept low to allow for productive 
interactions. A scoping report was produced and circulated in advance to serve as the basis for discussion.  
The workshop was be held under the Chatham House Rule and a report summarising the discussions was 
published online. 
 
Funding: 
This workshop was conducted under the auspices of, and with funding from, the EPSRC-funded Centre for 
Synthetic Biology and Innovation (CSynBI), which is a joint centre between King’s College London and 
Imperial College London; and with additional funding from two research projects: 
 
1. The project "An Infrastructure for Platform Technology in Synthetic Biology" led by Prof. Richard Kitney at 
Imperial College London and involving researchers from Imperial, King's College London, Edinburgh 
University, Cambridge University and Newcastle University, who together form the Flowers Consortium, 
funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). 
http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/J02175X/1 
 
2. The project "Engineered security systems for environmental synthetic biology" led by Dr Tom Ellis at 
Imperial College London, funded by the Joint Synthetic-Biology Initiative (JSBI), with co-funding from the 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), Biology and Biotechnology and Biology Sciences 
Research Council (BBRSC), EPSRC, and Medical Research Council (MRC). 
http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/pa/grants/AwardDetails.aspx?FundingReference=BB%2fJ019720%2f1 
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